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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 6, 1989, while on vacation at the Palmas Del Mar Resort in Puerto
Rico, a twelve-year old girl named Natalie Calhoun rented a "Wavejammer," a
type of jet ski made by Yamaha Motor Company.' Tragically, Natalie slammed
the jet ski into an anchored vessel and was killed.
Natalie was from Pennsylvania; the manufacturer of the jet ski was from
Japan; the distributor of the jet ski was a California corporation. Had Natalie
been killed on an inland lake, state law would have governed her case. Like any
other case having multi-state aspects, the lawyers representing Natalie's estate
would have to resolve the question of where to sue based in part on which law
will be applied. Because her accident occurred on navigable waters and probably
had a "substantial connection to traditional maritime activity," the choice of law
problem had an additional wrinkle: might federal admiralty law preempt any
state law regardless of where suit was brought?
Natalie's parents, who lived in Pennsylvania, sued Yamaha individually and
in their capacity as administrators of their daughter's estate in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania. They sued under Pennsylvania's wrongful death statute and its
survival statute, seeking recovery for negligence, strict liability, and breach of the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. Unlike most states, Pennsylva-
nia's survival statute permits recovery for lost future earnings.2 The parents
sought recovery for that element of damage as well as for loss of services and
support, loss of society, funeral expenses and punitive damages.
The trial court ruled that federal maritime law requires a uniform national
standard in cases like this one and that state law may only be used by the courts
in determining what the uniform federal law should be.3 It determined that lost
future earnings and punitive damages could not be awarded, but that loss of
society and loss of services and support could be awarded. The District Court
certified to the Court of Appeals the'questions of whether a federal maritime
Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law (Camden). A version of this article was
presented at the Maritime Personal Injury Seminar, Louisiana State University Law Center (October
18, 1996).
1. Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., Civ. A. 904295, 1993 WL 216238 (E.P. Pa. June
22, 1993). The jet ski was distributed by Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. The manufacturer and
distributor are referred to throughout the opinions and this article collectively as "Yamaha."
2. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8302 (1982).
3. Calhoun, 1993 WL 216238 at *7-8.
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cause of action may provide recovery for loss of society, lost future earnings,
and punitive damages.
The Third Circuit chose not to respond to the questions of law presented by
the District Court. Instead it addressed the underlying question presented by
the District Court's order: does federal maritime law preempt the state from
providing remedies for wrongful death and survival arising out of a death of a
non-seaman on territorial waters. The Court of Appeals concluded that state law
could be applied in this area. It left to the District Court the question of which
state law should apply, that of Pennsylvania or that of Puerto Rico.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously affirmed the Third
Circuit's decisions It held that the suit for wrongful death was within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts and that the federal wrongful death
action created in Moragne v. States Marine Lines6 did not displace state
remedies. The opinion leaves open several important issues and raises the
possibility that state law will have a much greater role to play in admiralty cases.
The Yamaha litigation raised jurisdictional and substantive law issues that
have been greatly affected by Supreme Court decisions since 1970. Prior to that
date there was no federal maritime wrongful death action for recreational boaters
killed on territorial waters.7 Also, at that time, torts were considered maritime
as long as they arose on the navigable waters. The Supreme Court has changed
both of these rules. There is now a judicially created cause of action for death
caused by a maritime tort. On the other hand, torts are no longer maritime just
because they arise on navigable waters. The courts have struggled to work out
the contours of these doctrinal innovations. In the process, the Supreme Court
has called into question the need for admiralty jurisdiction and has challenged
the conventional wisdom that the purpose of admiralty jurisdiction is to protect
maritime commerce by insuring a uniform substantive law. Additionally, given
the Court's increased sensitivity to states' rights, the Court appears to be
searching for a compass to guide it in allocating power between federal and state
governments in cases arising on or near the water.
This article will examine three developments in the law in admiralty that are
important for understanding Yamaha .and its implications: the scope of the
federal courts' jurisdiction over maritime torts, the law of wrongful death in
maritime cases, and the ability of federal and state authority to make law in
admiralty cases generally.
4. Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 40 F.3d 622 (3d Cir. 1994).
5. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996).
6. 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970).
7. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 79 S. Ct. 503 (1959). Seamen killed in
territorial waters were covered under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688. The Death on the High Seas Act,
codified at 46 U.S.C. § 761, covered any person who died from injuries inflicted outside the
territorial waters. Both of these statutes were enacted in 1920.
8. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865). See 1 Steven Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty
§ 171 n.4 (1996).
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II. MARITIME TORTS
The Yamaha case would have been a lot simpler had it been decided before
1970. As mentioned previously, at that time admiralty jurisdiction extended to
any tort on the navigable waters. Maritime jurisdiction extended to cases where
there was no connection to traditional maritime activity.9 Even though maritime
jurisdiction might therefore have been fortuitous in some instances, the states'
prerogatives were not entirely ignored. State law applied to several matters,
including the wrongful deaths of non-seamen killed within the territorial
waters"0 and survival actions generally." Consequently, prior to 1970, the
Yamaha case would have resolved simply: the federal courts exercising maritime
jurisdiction would have heard the case and applied state law. Oddly enough, the
Court in Yamaha resolved both the jurisdiction and the choice of law problems
in almost the same way. The Court held that the tort was maritime and that state
statutes could provide an additional remedy. But jurisdiction is not a game of
horseshoes, and the differences between how Yamaha was decided and how it
would have been decided thirty years ago reveal significant differences in
outlook and suggest significant differences in the outcomes of other cases.
. It may have seemed self-evident that the admiralty jurisdiction applied to any
tort on the navigable waters. If jurisdiction is a territorial-based concept, then
that is what Admiralty Courts should do. They should hear tort cases arising in
their jurisdiction. However, the territorial theory of tort'jurisdiction seemed out
of place when compared with the admiralty jurisdiction over contracts. In
contrast to the territorial theory of tort jurisdiction, courts applied a subject
matter jurisdiction to questions of contract law. A contract is maritime if its
subject matter is maritime.' The essential question is whether the contract is
related to a maritime service or transaction. 3 The place of contracting and the
place of performance might be on land, as is true of marine insurance, but the
contracts are maritime nonetheless. The subject matter test for maritime
contracts has problems of its own. 4 But what matters here is that the contract
9. E.g., Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940,
81 S. Ct. 343 (1963) (airplane crash); Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, Florida, 251 F. Supp. 327
(M.D. Fia. 1965) (injury to a swimmer by a surfboard).
10. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 79 S. Ct. 503 (1959).
!1. See Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 61 S. Ct. 687 (1941).
12. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870).
13. Id.
14. For example, contracts to build a ship are still regarded as being non-maritime. E.g.,
J.A.X, Inc. v. MN Lady Lucille, 963 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1992). The doctrine goes back to People's
Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 393 (1857). Another problem is that courts have struggled
to define which contracts are preliminary to maritime contracts and therefore non-maritime. E.g., E.S.
Binnings, Inc. v. MN Saudi Riyadh. 815 F.2d 660 (11 th Cir. 1987); Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v.
MN Bodena, 829 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042, 108 S. Ct, 774 (1988). The
Supreme Court overruled earlier authority and has held that agency contracts are not per se non-
19971
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cases suggest that courts should exercise admiralty jurisdiction only if there is
some purpose in having federal jurisdiction in that area. The idea of purpose
was largely absent in the tort cases-all that was needed there was that the tort
had occurred on the water, even if the subject matter of the tort did not relate to
a maritime service or transaction. Accidents involving surf boards, swimmers,
and air craft falling into the sea were maritime even though no purpose was
served by extending federal jurisdiction to these cases.'3
The idea was born that the purpose for admiralty jurisdiction was to have a
court with expertise in commercial shipping in order to further the federal
interests in the regulation of an industry vital to national interest. '6 Judged by
this standard the maritime tort cases were out of place. Maritime tort jurisdiction
was too broad. In 1972 the Supreme Court responded to these concerns in
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland." The Court noted several
problems with the territorial test, but oddly enough, did not jettison it. Instead
it added an additional test: did the tort have a substantial connection to
traditional maritime activity. The Court held that no sufficient connection existed
in cases of "aviation tort claims arising from flights by land-based aircraft
between points within the continental United States.""
With Executive Jet, the Court began a journey to almost nowhere. It looked
for a time that the decision might have kept cases out of the admiralty jurisdiction
that had little connection to maritime commerce. Pleasure craft cases, such as that
in Yamaha, have little connection to the federal interest in the business of shipping.
But ten years after deciding Executive Jet the Court made a sharp turn to port. Over
a strong dissent, the five person majority in Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richard-
son'9 held that pleasure craft collisions were within the admiralty jurisdiction. In
Foremost a collision between two pleasure boats resulted in the death of Clyde
Richardson, who was either a passenger or the operator of one of the boats." The
majority was concerned that noncommercial maritime activity could have a
disruptive effect on maritime commerce. The majority also felt that uniform rules
of liability would promote maritime commerce. Finally, they were concerned that
a rule limiting jurisdiction to collisions involving commercial vessels would be
maritime. Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, 500 U.S. 603, 111 S. Ct. 2071 (1991). The case may
signal a willingness to extend admiralty jurisdiction to other types of contracts.
IS. See supra note 9.
16. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50
Colum. L. Rev. 259 (1950).
17. 409 U.S. 249, 93 S. Ct. 493 (1972).
18. Id. at 273, 93 S. Ct. at 507.
19. 457 U.S. 668, 102 S. Ct. 2654 (1982).
20. 457 U.S. at 669, 102 S. CL at 2655. The lower court opinions neither give Mr.
Richardson's full name nor mention that he died. Another person on Mr. Richardson's boat, June
Allen, was injured. Richardson's wife and children sued Ms. Allen, the operator of the other boat
and the latter boat's insurer. Ms. Allen counterclaimed. Ms. Allen's attorney informed me that he
pursued the issue of admiralty jurisdiction because the state statute of limitations on torts had inn.
Interview with Victor Marcello, Esq. (October 18, 1996).
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uncertain and confusing. The more conservative dissenters, including Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor, argued that expanding admiralty jurisdiction to pleasure
boating displaced state law making responsibility.
All justices of the Foremost court agreed that there was a need for uniform
rules of the road and all justices assumed that extending admiralty jurisdiction
to pleasure boating meant displacing state substantive law. The majority thought
that application of state rules of liability would somehow undermine these
standards.21 The dissenters thought that rules of the road could be fixed by
Congress but that concerns for federalism should keep the courts from displacing
state substantive law.
We will shortly return to Foremost, for that decision is seriously compro-
mised by Yamaha. But first let us complete the voyage begun in Executive Jet.
For eight years following Foremost the Supreme Court left the lower courts to
their own devices. Most courts followed some variation of the Kelly test devised
by the Fifth Circuit.' This test listed several factors to be considered in
determining whether a case had sufficient connection to traditional maritime
activity.' The factors were sufficiently vague such that one could use them to
justify almost any result.24 Despite this shortcoming, the pattern established by
the cases suggested that cases would be outside the admiralty jurisdiction if they
involved only land-based parties whose injuries could have occurred in an
essentially identical way on land. In the 1990 decision, Sisson v. Ruby,2 the
21. This is a dubious assumption. Most boaters are motivated to engage in safe practices by
a desire to avoid accidents, not by the desire to avoid liability. It is highly doubtful that a state rule
of contributory negligence or a state rule capping the award of non-economic losses will encourage
boaters to act carelessly. Faced with an oncoming boat, it is rather far-fetched to assume that one
would disregard the rules of the road because of one's awareness that under state law one's liability
(to the extent one is not insured) will be less than maritime law. Even if we assume that rules of
liability did enter one's consciousness at times like these, it is possible that rules of contributory
negligence and caps on liability promote overall safety. If the about-to-be injured plaintiff were fully
aware of the limits on recovery, she would take safety precautions. Cf Preble Stolz, Pleasure
Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 Cal. L. Rev. 661, 712-14 (1963) (discussing accommodation
of state and federal law relating to pleasure boat liability).
22. Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973) (2-1 decision), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969,
94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974). Among the decisions adopting the Kelly test were: Drake v. Raymark Indus.,
772 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1126, 106 S. Ct. 1944 (1986); Oman v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971, 106 S. Ct. 351 (1985);
T.J. Falgout Boats, Inc. v. United States. 508 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000,
95 S. Ct. 2398 (1975). See generally Friedell, supra note 8, at § 171 n.48.
23. The factors were: 1) the functions and roles of the parties; 2) the types of vehicles and
instrumentalities involved; 3) the causation and type of injury; and 4) traditional concepts of the role
of admiralty law. In Molett v. Penrod Drilling Co., 826 F.2d 1419 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1003, 110 S. Ct. 563 (1989), the Court added three additional factors: I) the impact of the
event on maritime shipping and commerce; 2) the desirability of a uniform national rule to apply to
such matters; and 3) the need for admiralty "expertise" in the trial and decision of the case.
24. See Friedell, supra note 8, § 171 text, at nn.52 and 53.
25. 497 U.S. 358, 367 n.4, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 2897 n.4 (1990) (Kelly test not abblicable, at least
where all relevant entities are engaged in the similar types of activity).
1997]
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Supreme Court seemed to disapprove of the Kelly test and five years later in
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., the Court finally
rejected it. In its place the Court created a two-part test for determining
maritime connection." First, to be within the admiralty jurisdiction the incident
must be of the sort that has the potential to disrupt maritime commerce.s
Second, the tortfeasor's activity must be "so closely related to activity traditional-
ly subject to admiralty law that the reasons for applying special admiralty rules
would apply to the case at hand."' 29 Because parties could easily characterize
the incident and the activity in widely different ways, the Court stressed that the
test is not intended to be a "vehicle for eliminating admiralty jurisdiction,"'
and that "[t]he test turns on the comparison of traditional maritime activity to the
arguable maritime character of the tortfeasor's activity."' In other words, the
balance is struck in favor of exercising admiralty jurisdiction. Mindful that
admiralty jurisdiction might thus be extended into areas of state concern, the
Court asserted that "federal admiralty courts sometime do apply state law.
' ' 2
The Court has thus returned almost to its point of origin in Executive Jet. Cases
arising on the navigable waters will almost always be within the admiralty
jurisdiction if some type of watercraft is involved. The overreach of federal
adjudicatory jurisdiction is balanced by sensitivity to applying state law where
appropriate.
The effect of Sisson and Grubart is that courts will be presumed to have
admiralty jurisdiction in cases involving any type of vessel on navigable waters.
In place of a simple locality test which extended admiralty jurisdiction too
broadly, the Court has substituted a "locality plus" test which eliminates certain
airplane cases and a few others which have no relationship to the business of
shipping.
Following Grubart there was little question that the Yamaha case was within
the admiralty jurisdiction, and the Calhouns only faintly argued to the contrary.
Because ajet ski is a type of vessel, however small, and because the death occurred
on the navigable waters, jurisdiction was a foregone conclusion. The Supreme
Court settled the issue in one sentence, citing Sisson and Foremost.
26. 115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995).
27. Grubart made it clear that the requirement of maritime locality must also be established.
115 S. Ct. at 1048. For a detailed examination of the test under Grubart, see Thomas C. Galligan,
Jr., Of Incidents. Activities, and Maritime Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential Exegesis, 56 La. L. Rev.
519 (1996).
28. Grubart, 115 S. CL at 1048.
29. Id. at 1051.
30. Id. at 1052.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1054.
33. Brief for Respondents at 34. Yamaha Motor Corp,, U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619
(1996) (94-1387) ("Indeed, it is arguable that the tort here is not a maritime tort at all.").
34. The Court said simply, "Because this case involves a watercraft collision on navigable
waters, it falls within admiralty's domain." 116 S. Ct. at 623.
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. At first glance Foremost and Yamaha are not in conflict. Foremost holds
that collisions of even non-commercial vessels on the navigable waters are within
the admiralty jurisdiction; Yamaha holds that state wrongful death laws may
supplement federal wrongful death remedies. But on further examination, the
two cases are a disturbing pair. All the justices in Foremost, a case involving
wrongful death, assumed that federal jurisdiction preempts state law. Indeed the
majority thought that extending jurisdiction to pleasure boating had the purpose
of preempting state law so that "vessel operators [would be] subject to the same
duties and liabilities"3 which would not vary depending on which state they
were situated. But the unanimous decision in Yamaha held that even though the
collision of watercraft is within the admiralty jurisdiction, the measure of
damages imposed by state wrongful death statutes is not preempted. Under
Yamaha, federal law does not wholly preempt state law, but it does add a floor
to recovery. States may increase but not decrease the recoverable damages.
Yamaha thus frustrates the purpose of Foremost, to subject all vessel operators
to the same liability regardless of differing state laws.
.Yamaha goes even further. In its last footnote the Yamaha opinion draws
a distinction between rules on remedies and rules of liability.36 The opinion
purports to deal only with rules on remedies--damages in this instance. By
contrast, the footnote leaves open the possibility that state rules governing
liability may apply in admiralty and asserts that such has been the case in
wrongful death cases, citing Hess v. United States37 and The Tungus v.
Skovgaard.38 This comes as a surprise. As explained in the next section, Hess
and The Tungus had been thought to be overruled. But aside from that,
Foremost assumed that admiralty jurisdiction would preempt state liability rules
and insisted that federal law fix the duties and liabilities in pleasure boat cases.
By contrast, Yamaha suggests that state liability rules may hold sway, not only
in wrongful death cases, but in personal injury cases as well. If state rules
governing liability apply, then the purpose given in Foremost for having
admiralty jurisdiction over non-commercial collisions is largely frustrated. All
that would be left of the Foremost rationale is the concern that the line dividing
commercial from pleasure craft is an uncertain line.
If Foremost and Yamaha both remain good law, then the paradox will be
that the dissenters in Foremost will have achieved more than they intended.
Despite their fears that federal power would displace state prerogatives, federal
jurisdiction will not preempt state wrongful death remedies that provide more
35. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 676, 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2659 (1982). This
was echoed in Sisson v. Ruby where the Court said, "[t]he need for uniform rules of maritime conduct
and liability is not limited to navigation, but extends at least to any other activities traditionally
undertaken by vessels, commercial or noncommercial." Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367, 110 S.
Ct. 2892, 2898 (1990).
36. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. at 629 n.14 .
37. 361 U.S. 314, 80 S. Ct. 341 (1960).
38. 358 U.S. 588, 79 S. Ct. 503 (1959).
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liberal recoveries. Furthermore, these more liberal state remedies will be applied
to all cases within the admiralty jurisdiction-not just to those involving non-
commercial vessels. Beyond that, state power would be greatly increased if the
Court ultimately decides that state rules of liability may be applied to all
maritime tort cases, including non-fatal injuries.
III. WRONGFUL DEATH
The problem of maritime wrongful death has long plagued the courts.
Although the Supreme Court ruled in the 1886 case The Harrisburg39 that no
right to sue for wrongful death existed in admiralty, such actions were allowed
in state court and in diversity actions brought in the Circuit Court.' The
Supreme Court finally decided in 1921 that state wrongful death statutes could
be applied in admiralty." It followed suit twenty years later in holding that
state survival statutes could be given effect in admiralty.42 All of this might
have caused little trouble except that the Supreme Court created a strict liability
claim for seamen and longshore workers injured by an unseaworthy vessel.43
39. 119 U.S. 199, 7 S. Ct. 140 (1886). The Supreme Court held that the general maritime law
provided no recovery for wrongful death. Such actions can only be provided by statute. In this case
the plaintiff's decedent died in Massachusetts waters and the vessel, which was sued in rem, had its
home port in Philadelphia. Although the Court did not decide the matter, its opinion suggested that
admiralty courts might enforce a state statute for wrongful death. However, the statutes of limitations
of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania statutes had nn before suit was brought.
40. In American Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1872), the Supreme Court
allowed actions for wrongful death to be brought in state court under the saving to suitors clause,
which saved "the right of a common.law remedy where the common law is competent to give it"
Id. at 524. The Court rejected the argument that wrongful death actions were unknown to the
common law by holding that state wrongful death statutes only prevented a "failure of justice." Id.
The statutes corrected the comnn.1 law's failure to recognize that actions for personal injury survived
the .death of the injured party.
In The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 28 S. Ct. 133 (1907), the Court went a step farther, allowing suits
for wrongful death based on state statutes to be brought in Limitation of Liability actions filed in
admiralty. Again the Court did not decide whether such actions could be brought in admiralty
generally. But the opinion by Justice Holmes said that recognizing such suits in admiralty would not
produce "any lamentable lack of uniformity." Id. at 406, 28 S. Ct. at 135. A case decided the
following year, La Burgogne, 210 U.S. 95. 28 S. Ct. 664 (1908). enforced a French wrongful death
action in a limitation of liability suit. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S. Ct. 524
(1917). the Court listed wrongful death actions as among those matters that can be changed,
modified, or affected by state legislation, citing The Hamilton and La Burgogne. Finally, in Western
Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 42 S. Ct. 89 (1921), the Court upheld the right to sue in admiralty
under state wrongful death acts. The states had the power to make "some modifications or
supplements" in this area and since the death occurred within a state, the matter was "maritime and
'local" in character. Id. at 241-42, 42 S. Ct. at 90.
41. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 42 S. Ct. 89 (1921).
42. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 61 S. Ct. 687 (1941).
43. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S. Ct. 926 (1960); Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872 (1946); Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 64 S. Ct.
455 (1944).
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The Court created more confusion by holding that the Jones Act" preempted
state statutes from giving recovery for the wrongful death of a seaman caused by
unseaworthiness.' This put longshore workers in a better position than seamen.
Since longshore workers were not covered by the Jones Act, the estates of
longshore workers killed by unseaworthiness were able to recover under state
wrongful death statutes if those statutes applied. The problem was that
unseaworthiness was a maritime concept and not a common law tort.' Could
there be recovery for unseaworthiness if the state wrongful death statute did not
encompass unseaworthiness? A five-member majority of the Court said "no" in
The Tungus v. Skovgaard.'? It based its holding on The Harrisburg's statement,
"if the admiralty adopts the statute as a rule of right to be administered within
its own jurisdiction, it must take the right subject to the limitations which have
been made a part of its existence."'
The Tungus created severe difficulties. One year later in Hess v. United
States,' a badly divided court decided that Oregon's employer liability law
would be given effect in admiralty even though it created a higher standard of
care than maritime law provided. This time the four Tungus dissenters joined
the majority but "solely under compulsion of the Court's ruling" in The
Tungus." In addition, three justices who had joined the majority in The Tungus
now dissented. In short, a majority of the Court thought that the result in Hess
was wrong. Finally, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,"1 the Supreme Court
overruled The Harrisburg and created a federal wrongful death remedy.
Moragne involved a longshore worker who was killed while working aboard
a vessel in territorial waters in Florida. The federal District Cort dismissed the
unseawortliiness count but certified the question to the former Fifth Circuit. The
Court of Appeals, in turn, certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court.
The Florida Supreme Court advised the Court of Appeals that Florida's wrongful
death statute did not provide recovery for deaths caused by unseaworthiness12
The Fifth Circuit thereupon affirmed the District Court's order, stating that it was
44. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994).
45. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 85 S. Ct. 308 (1964). Seamen could
recover for non-fatal injuries caused by unseaworthiness. Also, seamen's estates could recover for
deaths outside the territorial waters caused by unseaworthiness under the Death on the High Seas Act
46. Unseaworthiness was known to the common law. Although its use as the basis for a
maritime tort for personal injury is of twentieth century origin, the concept is an ancient one in the
context of marine insurance and cargo damage. English common law courts exercised jurisdiction
over these disputes. See Grant Gilmore & Charles Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty § 1-4 (2d ed.
1975).
47. 358 U.S. 588, 79 S. CL 503 (1959).
48. 358 U.S. at 592, 79S. Ct. at 506 (quoting The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199,213,7 S. Ct. 140,
147 (1886)).
49. 361 U.S. 314, 80 S. CL 341 (1960).
50. Id. at 321, 80 S. Ct. at 347.
51. 398 U.S. 375, 409, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 1792 (1970).
52. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968).
1997]
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bound by The Tungus.3 The United States Supreme Court reversed. In a
unanimous opinion written by Justice Harlan, it overruled The Harrisburg and
held "that an action does lie under general maritime law for death caused by
violation of maritime duties."-"
The issue in Yamaha was whether Moragne preempted state wrongful death
statutes. The unanimous Court held that it did not. It reasoned that Moragne
established a floor but not a ceiling on wrongful death recoveries. Apparently,
the Court agreed with the Third Circuit's assessment that Moragne only
overruled The Harrisburg but left The Tungus and Hess undisturbed."3
It would seem that there are three ways of evaluating the Yamaha Court's
reading of Moragne. One way is simply that the Court was correct. Moragne
created a floor but not a ceiling. This view finds support in pre-Moragne cases
suggesting that federal courts used state wrongful death laws because state law
may "supplement" admiralty law when the matter is maritime but local.36 Even
though Moragne created a new right of wrongful death it did not stop states from
supplementing the law. A second way would be that the Court was wrong
because pre-Moragne admiralty courts used state wrongful death laws only to fill
a gap in the maritime law. 7 Since Moragne filled this gap there was now no
reason left to apply state law. As David Robertson has shown, it is impossible
to decide whether the "maritime but local" theory or the "gap" theory is the
correct one.5 If the pre-Moragne cases are seen as merely failing to provide
remedy, then the gap theory is correct. But if these early cases are seen as
holding that the general maritime law exempts defendants for wrongful death,
then the supplemental theory is correct. Of course, any rule denying recovery
in a particular case does two things: it fails to provide a remedy and affirmative-
ly creates an exemption.
A third approach would be to look at what Moragne says about the issue.
In its brief in Yamaha, the United States suggested to the Court that Moragne
had "no occasion" to consider whether state wrongful death laws may continue
to be used."' But the Supreme Court, like the Third Circuit, looked to Moragne
53. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969). Justice Blackmun did not
participate in the case.
54. 398 U.S. at 409, 90 S. Ct. at 1792.
55. As previously mentioned, the last footnote of the Court's opinion in Yamaha said that state
liability standards, as opposed to rules on remedies, hold sway in wrongful death cases, citing Hess
and The Tungus. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619, 629 n.14 (1996).
56. See, e.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 241, 42 S. Ct. 89, 90 (1921) ("the
power of a state to make some modifications or supplements was affirmed [by the Jensen line of
cases]"). See infra text accompanying notes 83-86.
57. The United States made this argument to the Court in Yamaha. Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae at 14, Yamaha (94.1387).
58. David W. Robertson, Displacement of State Law by Federal Maritime Law, 26 J. Mar. L.
& Com. 325, 340-41 (1995).
59. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Yamaha (94-1387). Nonetheless the
United States argued that state remedies should not be applicable. Id. Their reason was that prior
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for clues. The Supreme Court in Yamaha supported its view that states could
provide additional remedies for wrongful death by observing that Moragne
"notably left in place the negligence claim [Petsonella Moragne, the personal
representative and widow] had stated under Florida law."' The Court of
Appeals in Yamaha paraphrased a statement in Moragne, saying "the Moragne
Court 'concluded that the primary source of the confusion [in the law of
maritime wrongful deaths) is not to be found in The Tungus, but in The
Harrisburg.""' From this the Third Circuit concluded that The Tungus'
holding that rights of non-seamen killed in state territorial waters depend on state
statutes "retains vitality post-Moragne."'2
Both of these clues from Moragne are far from clear. First, Moragne left
the Florida negligence claim alone because it was not before the Court. As
noted by the Yamaha Court, the Court of Appeals in Moragne heard the case
pursuant to a 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) certification directed solely to the District
Court's order dismissing the unseaworthiness claim. 3 However, the holding
in Moragne was not limited to unseaworthiness. The Court held "that an action
does lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime
duties."" As recognized by the Yamaha Court, this encompasses not only
unseaworthiness but also products liability and negligence."5 Thus, if Moragne
precludes state wrongful death law for unseaworthiness, then on remand Mrs.
Moragnes' claim for negligence should also have been decided under federal
standards.
The second clue from Moragne, that it found the "primary source of the
confusion" in The Harrisburg, not in The Tungus, is also not clear evidence that
it intended to leave The Tungus standing. The language must be understood in
context. In both the Court of Appeals and in her petition for certiorari, Mrs.
Moragne had challenged the validity of The Tungus, but not the validity of The
Harrisburg. The Supreme Court requested the parties and the United States,
which the Court had invited to participate as amicus curiae, to brief the issue of
whether it should overrule The Harrisburg. After recounting the division in the
Court in The Tungus, the Court continued:
The extent of the role to be played by state law under The Tungus has
been the subject of substantial debate and uncertainty in this Court, see
Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 80 S.Ct. 341, 4 L.Ed.2d 305
to Moragne state law filled a gap that Moragne closed. Id. at 14. By contrast, Yamaha argued that
Moragne rendered The Tungu moot and "intended to provide a uniform maritime wrongful death
remedy." Brief for Petitioners at 38-39, Yamaha (94.1387).
60. 116 S. Ct. at 627-28.
61. Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 40 F.3d 622, 641 n.39 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 378, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 1776 (1970)).
62. 40 F.3d 622 at 641 n.39.
63. 116 S. Ct. at 628 n.12. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 376, 90 S. Ct. at 1775.
64. 398 U.S. at 409, 90 S. Ct at 1792.
65. 116 S. Ct. at 627 n.1l.
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(1960); Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340, 80 S.Ct. 357, 4
L.Ed.2d 341 (1960), with opinions on both sides of the question
acknowledging the shortcomings in the present law. See 361 U.S., at
314-315, 338-339, 80 S.Ct., at 343, 356. On fresh consideration of the
entire subject, we have concluded that the primary source of the
confusion is not to be found in The Tungus, but in The Harrisburg, and
that the latter decision, somewhat dubious even when rendered, is such
an unjustifiable anomaly in the present maritime law that it should no
longer be followed. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals."
The "confusion" referred to is not just the confusion of "law of maritime
wrongful deaths" as the Third Circuit thought, but the "extent of the role to be
played by state law under The Tungus.6 7 Seen in this way, it is not at all clear
that the Court meant to keep The Tungus alive to provide additional recoveries
over those allowed by federal law. It would be rather odd if it had, because
Justice Harlan, the author of Moragne, had dissented in Hess on the grounds that
states could not prescribe a higher standard of care than that required by
maritime law." Moreover, the Moragne Court went on to rule that Mrs.
Moragne's "challenge to The Tungus is properly before us on certiorari, and, of
course, it subsumes the question of the continuing validity of The Harrisburg,
upon which The Tungus rests."" Later, the Court referred to The Tungus as the
"corollary" of The Harrisburg."7 If The Tungus "rests" on The Harrisburg,
and is its corollary, then with the overruling of The Harrisburg, the latter case
is left hanging in mid-air.
Indeed, Moragne provides ample evidence that the Court intended the new
federal wrongful death remedy to preempt state law. The Moragne Court noted
that the creation of a right to recover under general maritime law "will assure
uniform vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies
that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to
exclusively maritime substantive concepts."7' If Moragne meant to preserve
state damages for wrongful death it would be defeating these goals.7
Further evidence of Moragne's intent can be gleaned from its statement that
"(f]ederal law, rather than state, is the more appropriate source of a remedy for
66. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 378, 90 S. Ct. at 1776 (footnote omitted).
67. Id.
68. Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 322, 80 S. Ct. 341, 347 (1960).
69. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 378 n.1, 90 S. Ct at 1776 n.I (end of footnote).
70. 398 U.S. at 404, 90 S. Ct. at 1790.
71. 398 U.S. at 401, 90 S. Ct. at 1788.
72. The Yamaha Court gave this language of Moragne a limited effect. It said, "[the Court
surely meant to 'assure uniform vindication of federal policies'.. . with respect to the matters it
examined." 116 S. Ct at 627. By this the Yamaha Court referred to the anomalies created by the
lack of a maritime wrongful death recovery for unseaworthiness.
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violation of the federally imposed duties of maritime law.""' Moreover, the
Court said that The Harrisburg "in conjunction with its corollary, The Tungus,
has produced a litigation-spawning confusion in an area that should be easily
susceptible of more workable solutions.... To supplant the present disarray in
this area with a rule both simpler and more just will further, not impede,
efficiency in adjudication."' All of this language in Moragne strongly suggests
that the Court intended the new federal cause of action to replace the use of state
law and not to be a gap-filling measure as the Yamaha Court read it." Most
courts76 and treatises" read Moragne that way.
Although Yamaha is inconsistent with the purpose of Moragne, the
differences may be contained. As mentioned before, the Yamaha Court limited
its holding to allowing state-created remedies, including damages, that exceed the
remedies under federal law. It left open the possibility that federal law might
govern exclusively the determination of liability standards.7" Whether the Court
will take such a step depends to some extent on its overall view of the role of
state and federal governments in fashioning law in admiralty cases. We will deal
with that question in the next section.
73. 398 U.S. at 401 n.15, 90 S. Ct. at 1788 n.15.
74. 398 U.S. at 404, 90 S. Ct at 1790.
75. 116 S. CL at 628.
76. E.g., Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1089, (2d Cir. 1993)
(collecting cases); In re S/S Helena, 529 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1976); Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d
469 (9th Cir. 1980); Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. v. Estate of Dau Van Tran, 808 S.W.2d 61
(rex. 1991); Bell v. Bahr.DeRose, Inc., 1982 AMC 1185 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981), cert. denied, 93 N.J.
273 (1983). The Third Circuit's decision in Calhoun was the first federal decision of its kind. See
also Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. v. Estate of Dau Van Tran, 777 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989) (applying state law), vacated, 497 U.S. 1020, 110 S. Ct. 3266 (1990). Under Moragne, state
wrongful death acts were to be used as one guide in fashioning the maritime remedy. 398 U.S. at
408, 90 S. Ct. at 1791-92.
77. Friedell, supra note 8, § 113; Thomas Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law 412 (2d
ed. 1994); 2 Alexander Sann et al., Benedict on Admiralty § 81, at 7-14 (1984) (lower courts dispute
whether in fashioning the maritime remedy greater deference should be given to state or federal
remedies but "both schools of thought held that a Moragne-type action preempted the operation of
state wrongful death acts'); Grant Gilmore & Charles Black, The Law of Admiralty § 6-32 (2d ed.
1975). Contra C.A. Wright, A.R. Miller & E.H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3672
(Supp. 1992). Wright and Miller based their view on a reading of Offshore Logistics, Inc. v.
Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. 2485 (1986). Tallentire held that the Death on the High Seas
Act preempted state wrongful death statutes from applying to deaths on the high seas. Wright and
Miller concluded from this that state law would apply to deaths from injuries in territorial waters.
This conclusion would have been correct before Moragne. The issue is whether Moragne changed
the outcome.
78. 116 S. Ct. at 629 n.14. The Solicitor General's brief in Moragne took the position that
overruling The Harrisburg would produce a "uniform non.statutory action" that "would permit the
application of a single standard of conduct to govern both fatal and non-fatal injuries in all personal
injury actions." The brief further pointed out that such a rule would rectify the "equally anomalous
situations in which a differing standard of liability has been required by State law." Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 21, Yamaha (94-1387).
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IV. FEDERALISM AND ADMIRALTY
We have suggested in the previous two sections that the Court's decision in
Yamaha is inconsistent with the rationale of Foremost in extending admiralty
jurisdiction to pleasure boating accidents and that it ignores the intention of
Moragne to replace state wrongful death statutes with a uniform federal scheme.
How could the Court reach such a result? Some of the questions raised at the
oral argument suggest that at least one member of the Court felt that there is
little, if any, federal interest in denying recovery of lost future earnings to the
family of a twelve-year old girl against the manufacturer of a jet ski." This is
a legitimate concern. Neither the child nor the jet ski manufacturer are involved
in the business of shipping. Their dispute is within the admiralty jurisdiction
only because of Foremost's concern that admiralty jurisdiction needs to include
pleasure boating because of the effects pleasure boaters have on commercial
traffic. But the dispute between the parties in Yamaha-a products liability suit
about a recreational product-is the kind of dispute routinely resolved by state
law.s"
The result in Yamaha-that the parents are given a chance that
Pennsylvania's liberal survival action will apply9'-is consistent with this
concern. However, the holding in Yamaha is quite different. First, it applies
even to situations where the federal interest predominates. For example, state
wrongful death law that expanded damage recovery beyond Moragne would
govern commercial vessel owners who cause the death of passengers or
recreational boaters in territorial waters. Second, Yamaha does not allow all state
laws to trump federal laws even in situations where the state interest predomi-
nates. For example, if state law were to limit wrongful death recoveries more
than federal law, Yamaha would still insist that the federal law be given effect.
Yamaha is the latest in a series of cases where the Supreme Court has
redefined the roles of federal and state governments in making admiralty law.
The Yamaha Court asserted that its decision would "attempt no grand synthesis
79. "(W]hat is the Federal interest in uniformity in connection with a jet ski accident in
territorial waters? Why do we need to apply admiralty law and seek uniformity? Why isn't that
much closer to traditional State negligence actions, where State law should govern?" Oral
Arguments, 1995 WL 648001 at 10-1I, Yamaha (94-1387). "Why can't State law apply up until the
point where there's a genuine collision with some authentic Federal interest?" Id. at 25. Justice
Kennedy apparently raised the concern. Id. at 38.
80. As stated in the Third Circuit decision in Yamaha:
To accept Yamaha's position in this case would create the opposite of the problem faced
in Moragne, for we would be grafting a compensation scheme designed principally for
seamen onto cases that fit easily within the tort systems developed by the states. This
case is, at base, no different than a cause of action arising out of the average motor
vehicle accident.
Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 40 F.3d 622, 644 (3d Cir. 1994).
81. On remand the District Court will have to decide whether to apply the law of Puerto Rico
or Pennsylvania.
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or reconciliation" of the precedents. '  The decision, however, is bound to
influence future decisions in this troubled area.
Some background is necessary to appreciate where the Yamaha Court was
coming from and where it has left us. Since 1917 the federal government has
predominated in making admiralty law. In that year the Court decided Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen" which struck down New York's workers compensation
law as applied to longshoremen injured aboard ships on navigable waters. The
Court laid down three rules: 1) state law cannot "contravene the essential
purpose expressed by an act of Congress"; 2) state law cannot work "material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law"; and 3) state
law cannot interfere "with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its
international and interstate relations."" Beyond that the Court gave several
examples drawn from previous'cases of permissible and impermissible state laws.
As previously mentioned, state laws could create remedies in wrongful death
cases. Additionally, state statutes can create liens on vessels repaired in their
home ports, and state law may regulate pilotage fees. However, states may not
create In rem proceedings and may not create liens on foreign ships.
Jensen was extended one year later to preclude state tort from applying to
seamen injured at sea."5 Two years after that, in Knickerbocker Ice v. Stew-
art," the Court held that Congress cannot evade Jensen by delegating to the
states the authority to create workers compensation for longshore workers.
Perhaps the high water mark of Jensen was reached in 1953 when the Court in
Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn'7 declared that Pennsylvania's contributory
negligence doctrine could not be applied to a land-based contractor who worked
for a repair company that contracted to repair a vessel that was berthed at a pier
in Philadelphia. Because his injury constituted a maritime tort, the Constitution
had placed his cause of action "under national power to control in 'its substantive
as well as its procedural features."' u Federal power "is dominant in this
field." "While states may sometimes supplement federal maritime policies,
a state may not deprive a person of any substantial admiralty rights as defined
in controlling acts of Congress or by interpretive decisions of [the Supreme
Court.]1 0
82. 116 S. Ct. at 626 n.8.
83. 244 U.S. 205, 37 S. CL 524 (1917).
84. The Court adopted these three rules with slight modification and without attribution from
City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1893).
85. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.. 247 U.S. 372, 38 S. Ct. 501 (1918).
86. 253 U.S. 149, 40 S. Ct. 438 (1920). See also Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264
U.S. 219, 44 S. Ct. 302 (1924).
87. 346 U.S. 406, 74 S. Ct. 202 (1953).
88. 346 U.S. at 409, 74 S. CL at 205 (quoting Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386,
44 S. Ct. 391, 393 (1924)).
89. 346 U.S. at 410, 74 S. Ct. it 205.
90. Id. at 409-10, 74 S. Ct at 205.
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From the start Jensen was riddled by inconsistencies and subjected to heavy
criticism. Jensen itself could not satisfactorily explain why some state laws were
given effect and others not. Why, for example, could state wrongful death law
be applied in admiralty but not state workers compensation law? Jensen itself
acknowledged that "it would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with
exactness just how far the general maritime law may be changed, modified, or
affected by state legislation."" It is unlikely that a test, unable from the start
to explain the state of the law, would provide a more certain guide in later cases.
Four justices dissented in Jensen." On the other hand, Jensen's strength may
have been the flexibility it gave courts.
Justice Holmes dissented in Jensen, arguing that states have the dominant
role in fashioning maritime law. He wrote: "The common law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or
quasisovereign that can be identified .... It always is the law of some
State .... "" But Justice Holmes did not insist that state law always controlled
maritime cases. He thought that state law did not apply to some admiralty issues
because the District Courts "regarded their jurisdiction as limited by ancient
lines."'4 The four Jensen dissenters insisted that at the very least state courts
were free to apply state law even if it differed from the maritime rule.
Criticism of Jensen continued unabated. In Just v. Chambers, decided in
1941, the Court referred with approval to a long list of state regulations that were
given effect in admiralty in City of Norwalk," a late nineteenth-century District
Court case. The list included liens for expenses of seamen at a quarantine
hospital, regulation of rivers, harbors, and wharves, the protection of fisheries,
quarantine laws, and establishing and regulating ferries."a Further, Jensen's
holding even as applied to workers compensation cases was eroded in 1943 by
the creation of the "twilight zone"--where recovery could be had under both
federal and state workers compensation laws when it was doubtful which one
applied." A few months later, the Court said that Jensen had been "severely
limited and has no vitality beyond that which may continue as to state
workmen's compensation laws."'"
In 1955, the Court upheld the application of state law that regulates marine
insurance in the absence of an established federal admiralty rule.99 The Court
stressed that Congress had established a policy of deferring to states in regulating
91. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216, 37 S. Ct. 524, 529 (1917).
92. Id. at 255, 37 S. Ct. at 544.
93. Id. at 222, 37 S. Ct. at 531.
94. Id.
95. 55 F. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1893).
96. The Court had upheld the state inspection of vessels when the state regulations did not
conflict with federal statutes. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 87 (1937).
97. Davis v. Department of Labor & Industries, 317 U.S. 249, 63 S. Ct. 225 (1942).
98. Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306, 63 S. Ct. 1067 (1943). This case
upheld the rights of states to collect unemployment taxes from maritime employers.
99. Wilbum Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 75 S. Ct. 368 (1955).
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insurance matters. Without ever citing Jensen or Knickerbocker Ice, the Court
in a footnote summarily dismissed as "lacking in merit" the argument that the
Constitution forbade states to regulate marine insurance." °  Moreover the
opinion said, "[i]n the field of maritime contracts as in that of maritime torts, the
National Government has left much regulatory power in the States," and gave a
"But cf." reference to Pope & Talbot which it decided just two years earlier.'O'
Later, in 1973, the Court again recognized the power of Congress to confer
power on the states to regulate maritime affairs-in this instance maritime
pollution.tea This time the Court addressed Jensen and Knickerbocker Ice,
saying that they "have been confined to their facts, viz., to suits relating to the
relationship of vessels playing the high seas and our navigable waters, and to
their crews."1°3
Some courts have tried to apply Jensen by balancing the interests between
the federal and state laws that are in conflict.'0 ' The difficulty with this
approach is that it requires courts to weigh incommensurable policies. °" But
courts frequently resort to this type of balancing, and the approach retains its
appeal as courts are unwilling to enforce a federal law in the face of what it
senses is a strong state interest.
There the matter stood for several years. Summing up the situation,
Professors Gilmore and Black remarked in 1957 and again in 1975:
[T]he line will still have to be drawn from case to case. The concepts
that have been fashioned for drawing it are too vague ... to ensure
either predictability or wisdom in the line's actual drawing. All that can
be said in general is that the states may not flatly contradict established
maritime law, but may "supplement" it, to the extent of allowing
recoveries in [some] cases where it emphatically denies them; that states
may legislate freely on shipping matters that are of predominantly local
concern, but they may not so act as to interfere with the uniform
working of the federal maritime legal system.... [T]he law has not
reached a firm resting-place.' 0"
100. Id. at 321 n.29, 75 S. CL at 375 n.29.
101. Id. at 314 n.8, 75 S. Ct. at 370 n.8.
102. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 93 S. CL 1590 (1973).
103. Id. at 344, 93 S. Ct. at 1590.
104. E.g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 81 S. Ct. 886 (1961); Exxon Corp. v.
Chick Kam Cboo, 817 F.2d 307, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 108 S. CL 1684
(1988); Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corp., 779 F.2d 1485, 1488 (11 th Cir. 1986).
105. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897, 108 S. Ct.
2218, 2224 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticising the balancing approach under the "negative"
Commerce Clause cases).
106. Grant Gilmore and Charles Black, The Law ofAdmiralty44-45 (1957) (footnote omitted).
The second edition had the same wording except that the writers substituted "maritime law" for the
second "it" in the second sentence to clarify the meaning. Grant Gilmore and Charles Black, The
Law of Admiralty 49-50 (2d ed. 1975).
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So matters stood until 1994 when the Supreme Court decided American
Dredging Co. v. Miller.07 American Dredging involved a Mississippi worker
who moved to Pennsylvania. He was injured while working on the Delaware
River and received medical treatment in New York and Pennsylvania before
returning to Mississippi. He sued in Louisiana state court for recovery under the
Jones Act and for unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and for wages.
American Dredging moved to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Reversing the
lower courts, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that Louisiana's Code of Civil
Procedure, which makes the doctrine of forum non conveniens unavailable in
Jones Act and maritime law cases, is not preempted by federal maritime law.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Louisiana
Supreme Court. In their four opinions, the justices revealed deep divisions about
the reach and continued validity of the Jensen doctrine.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, gave luke-warm support to
the Jensen doctrine, noting that it was "inappropriate to overrule Jensen in
dictum, and without argument or even invitation."'08 The Court also said: "It
would be idle to pretend that the line separating permissible from impermissible
state regulation is readily discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence, or indeed
is even entirely consistent within our admiralty jurisprudence.""0' Moreover,
the Court rejected the idea that the "unifying theme of this aspect" of its
admiralty jurisprudence was that states may not impair maritime commerce." 0
The Court did not see the need to reconcile the cases because it was able to
distinguish Jensen. It did so on two separate grounds. First, the doctrine of forum
non conveniens was not a "characteristic feature of the general maritime law"
because it did not originate in admiralty or have exclusive application there."'
Second, the doctrine of forum non conveniens would not offend the uniformity of
maritime law because it was procedural and because it was unpredictable since it
required the trial judge to exercise discretion in balancing many factors.":2
Justice Souter joined in the majority opinion and wrote a short concurring
opinion suggesting that federal maritime law preempts state law whenever the
latter "unduly interferes with the federal interest in maintaining a free flow of
maritime commerce.""' 3
Justice Stevens thought Jensen to be an unhelpful guide. He questioned
whether the admiralty jurisdiction was intended to protect maritime commerce
from the burdens of "discordant legislation."" 4 While not willing to "abandon
107. 510 U.S. 443, 114 S. CL 981 (1994).
108. Id. at 447 n.1, 114 S. Ct. at 985 n.I.
109. Id. at 450, 114 S. Ct. at 987.
110. Id. at 453 n.3, 114 S. CL at 988 n.3.
.111. Id. at 452, 114 S. Ct at 987.
112. Id. at 454, 114 S. Ct. at 989.
113. Id. at 456,114 S. Ct. at 990.
114. 510 U.S. at 461. 114 S. Ct. at 992 (quoting Knickerbocker Ice v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149,
164, 40 S. Ct. 438, 441 (1920)).
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commerce as a guiding concern," he asserted that maritime commerce is
adequately protected by Congress' broad authority to legislate under the
Commerce Clause, and state laws that affect maritime commerce are subject to
judicial scrutiny under the negative Commerce Clause doctrine and under the
Due Process Clause.'
Two justices, Kennedy and Thomas, would have strick down the Louisiana
rule based on Jensen. They thought that Louisiana's rule "upset[] international and
interstate comity and obstruct(ed maritime trade.""16
American Dredging did more than add another case to the case-by-case
analysis that Gilmore and Black predicted would endure. It changed the nature of
the landscape. First, Jensen's "characteristic feature" test may now be almost
meaningless. There are few, if any, maritime doctrines that originated in admiralty
and which have exclusive application there. For example, the doctrine that the
plaintiff's fault did not bar recovery, once thought to be a feature of the admiral-
ty,1 7 is now common among the states. A tort recovery for unseaworthiness is
a maritime concept, but it is a species of liability without fault, a concept well
known to the common law. Salvage may have originated in admiralty, but it has
been applied to the calculation of attorneys' fees in class action litigation. "'
General average (the idea that the sacrifice of one part of a marine venture to save
the whole venture ought to be borne by all members of the venture) has parallels
in the ancient regulation of caravans" 9 and is similar to modern doctrines of
restitution. °
It is not clear from American Dredging if a doctrine must both originate in
admiralty and be unique to admiralty for it to be a characteristic feature or if one
of these two tests will suffice. But any maritime doctrine that just happens to fulfill
one or even both of these tests should hardly on that basis alone be able to preempt
a state law. If the state law gave effect to an overwhelming state interest and made
little difference to maritime commerce, there is no reason to prefer a maritime
115. SIOU.S.at461, 114 S. Ct. at 992.
116. Id. at 462, 114 S. Ct. at 993.
117. Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S. Ct. 202 (1953); The Max Morris, 137 U.S.
1, 11 S. Ct. 29 (1890); The Wanderer, 20 F. 140 (C.C.E.D. La. 1884).
118. E.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d
102 (3d Cir. 1976); In re King Resources Company Securities Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 610 (D. Colo.
1976). See generally George D. Homstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel
Fee Awards, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 658, 682 (1956).
119. See 1. Epstein, The Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 116b (1935): "if a caravan was
traveling through the wilderness and a band of robbers threatened to plunder it, the apportionment
[for buying them off] will have to be made according with the [value] of possessions [in the caravan,]
but not in accordance with the number of persons there. But if they hire a guide to go in front of
them, the calculation will have to be made also according to the number of souls in the caravan,
though they have no right to deviate from the general custom of the ass-drivers .... ." This not only
shows a rule like that of general average but also suggests that ass-drivers had a custom on the
subject. See Steven Friedell, Admiralty and the Sea of Jewish Law, 27 J. of Maritime L. &
Commerce 647, 656-57 (1996).
120. See Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. 532, 76 S. Ct. 617 (1956).
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doctrine just because it originated there and is only applied there. Something more
than pride and nostalgia ought to guide the courts in depriving states of the ability
to give effect to their own policies.
The second change made by American Dredging is to limit Jensen to non-
procedural rules. Even though procedural rules, such as forum non conveniens,
have substantive effects, the Court excluded them from Jensen's reach. Moreover,
the Court's reasoning would indicate that federal rules whose application is
unpredictable do not preempt state law. That is, if the federal rule is unpredictable
in its application, it is not a rule that would foster uniformity. Therefore the
uniformity concerns of Jensen would not be undermined by applying a contrary
state law. This theory can undermine all of Jensen's uniformity doctrine. Any rule
of law which defers to a fact finder's weighing of conflicting evidence is
unpredictable in its application. For example, determining the amount of
compensation for pain and suffering is an inexact science. A fact finder's
determination of the amount of compensation is not predictable. Consequently, it
can be argued that the federal interest in uniformity would not be hindered by
applying a state limitation on such damages. Moreover, whether a particular set of
facts constitutes negligence or unseaworthiness is a question left to the fact finder
and not lightly overturned by the reviewing courts. Since predictability of the
outcome is uncertain, it would not offend uniformity for states to prescribe a
different standard of liability. State regulation in these areas may change the
outcome in many cases, but American Dredging reminds us that "[tihe requirement
of uniformity is not absolute."'' Taken to these extremes, the American
Dredging test of uniformity undermines the concept entirely. These examples may
be extreme, but recall that American Dredging did not draw the line between
permissible and impermissible state regulation. It only ruled that wherever the line
will be drawn, a rule that is procedural and unpredictable in application is not
protected by Jensen.
The majority opinion and Justice Stevens' concurrence in American Dredging
suggested another factor that may undermine Jensen. These opinions suggested
that Congressional action or inaction would be important in its determination of
whether a state statute may be given effect. The majority opinion drew support
from Congress' enactment of the Jones Act and saw a need to harmonize its rule
for general maritime law claims with the rule of forum non conveniens applicable
to Jones Act actions. Justice Stevens went further. Since Congress has not
exercised the power to prescribe a forum non conveniens rule for state courts in
admiralty cases, Congress must have "opted to permit state 'diversity' in admiralty
matters," making federal preemption "inappropriate." ''" There is only one area
where Congress has prescribed that federal general maritime law preempts state
law. In passing the Admiralty Extension Act, Congress indicated its intention that
the state law of contributory negligence would yield to the federal rule of divided
121. 510U.S.at451, 114 S. Ct. at 987.
122. Id. at 461, 114 S. Ct. at 992.
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damages in collision cases between a vessel and a bridge." If the Court looks
to Congressional silence as an invitation for state law to be applied in admiralty
cases, then Jensen will be moot except in ship to shore collision cases.
One year after American Dredging the Court decided another admiralty case,
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. 2 ' As discussed
previously, Grubart held that the admiraltyjurisdiction extended to torts committed
by a crane sitting on a barge in the Chicago River which caused flooding of
buildings in the Chicago Loop." The City of Chicago, one of the defendants in
the action, contended that if the torts were maritime then state law would be
preempted to the detriment of the land-based parties. The Court responded that
preemption was not a sure thing. Moreover the Court adopted part of Justice
Stevens' reasoning in American Dredging. It questioned whether admiralty
jurisdiction was designed to promote maritime commerce. Uniform rules of
decision in admiralty cases were but a "subsidiary goal." It suggested that
admiralty jurisdiction may have primarily been designed to provide a neutral forum
away from local bias in cases involving foreigners." 6
The protection of maritime commerce through uniform national laws is not
what it used to be. American Dredging said that the Jensen doctrine was not
concerned with preventing the impairment of maritime commerce, and Grubart has
demoted the interest in uniform rules of decision to a secondary status. Coming on
top of these two cases, Yamaha signals that a serious reconsideration of Jensen or
even a fundamental rearrangement of federal and state relations in the maritime
field may be underway. A later decision might confine each of these three cases.
American Dredging dealt only with procedure; Grubart's mention that state law
may be applicable was only dictum; and Yamaha did not even mention Jensen, but
dealt only with a "modest question"'27 of the continuation of state wrongful death
remedies after Moragne. The tone of these cases, however, suggests something
much broader. The Court is tired of Jensen and its progeny. It prefers to defer to
Congressional judgment about questions of maritime law generally and about
questions of federal preemption specifically.!" It prefers to defer to the states
when the state interest is strong. And the Court seems to be searching for a
compass to help it chart its course.
123. See H. R. Rep. No. 1523, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948).
124. 513 U.S. 527, 115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995).
125. See supra text at note 26.
126. 115 S. Ct at 1054 n.6. One difficulty with this reasoning is that state courts are still
available in cases involving foreigners. It is generally thought that if there is diversity jurisdiction
or some other basis for federal jurisdiction except admiralty jurisdiction, the foreigner-defendant can
remove to federal court based on diversity. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354, 371-72, 79 S. Ct. 468, 480 (1959); Armstrong v. Alabama Power Co., 667 F.2d 1385 (11th
Cir. 1982). See generally I Steven Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty § 131 (1997) (forthcoming).
127. 116 S. Ct. at 626 n.8.
128. See. e.g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27, 111 S. Ct. 317, 323 (1990)
("Congress retains superior authority in these matters, and an admiralty court must be vigilant not
to overstep the well-considered boundaries imposed by federal legislation.").
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V. Is THERE A WAY OUT?
Each time the courts or Congress have extended the admiralty jurisdiction, they
have created potential conflict with state sovereignty. In 1847 the Court rejected
an English limitation and extended admiralty jurisdiction to waters within the body
of a county.'29 Four years later, guided by Congress but not considering itself
bound by it, the Supreme Court extended admiralty jurisdiction to cover the Great
Lakes and the inland navigable rivers. '" In 1948, Congress extended admiralty
jurisdiction to include injuries caused by a vessel when the injuries occured on
land.'3 In Foremost, the Court extended admiralty jurisdiction to pleasure
boating. The scope of the intrusion on state sovereignty of each of these intrusions
is magnified by theJensen holding that state courts are bound to apply the same law
that federal courts would apply to admiralty cases.
The courts or Congress might try more than one way out of the maze of
admiralty jurisdiction. One way to resolve some of the conflict would be to
overrule Foremost and hold that pleasure boating cases, including the type of case
involved in Yamaha, are outside the admiralty jurisdiction. The Court is unlikely
to take this course because it would often be impractical to determine at an early
stage of litigation whether a case involves pleasure boating or commercial
shipping. 1
2
Another way to resolve the conflict might be to limit admiralty jurisdiction to
cases involving vessels over a certain size.' This approach has the advantage
of eliminating most pleasure boating accidents from admiralty jurisdiction, but will
not avoid the choice of law problem. Larger vessels in territorial waters will still
be subject to state law some of the time. Additionally, collisions between commer-
cial vessels and pleasure boats (like the collision in Yamaha) will still be within
admiralty jurisdiction.
Another type of solution might be to return to the pre-Jensen era where state
courts and federal courts having diversity jurisdiction applied state law as the rule
of decision whereas federal courts having admiralty jurisdiction applied maritime
law. But after Erie it is most unlikely that courts would return to a scheme whereby
the law applied to a case differed depending on which court one was in or on
whether there was diversity jurisdiction.
Nor would it be feasible to turn Jensen upside down and require federal courts
to apply state law in maritime cases. The Court cannot at this late date abandon the
many areas where federal judge-made law provides the rule of decision. Cases
involving collision, seamen's injuries based on unseaworthiness, maintenance and
129. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847).
130. The Genesee Chief. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
131. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1994).
132. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 676, 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2659 (1982).
133. Such an approach, supported by the American Law Institute, was introduced in the Senate
in 1973. See S. Bill 1876, 93d. Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in Jo Desha Lucas, Admiralty,
1991 Statute, Rule and Case Supplement 235 (1991).
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cure, salvage, general average, and charter parties, are governed largely by federal
judge-made law. It would be overwhelmingly disruptive to declare at this point that
henceforth these areas will no longer be governed by federal admiralty law but by
state laws. For similar reasons it would not be feasible to limit the federal judge-
made law to cases arising on the high seas or within the ebb and flow of the tide or
outside the body of a county.
The approach suggested by Justice Stevens in American Dredging Co. v. Miller
for resolving choice of law questions in admiralty cases may have some promise.
Justice Stevens would abandon the Jensen "special maritime pre-emption doctrine
and its abstract standards of 'proper harmony' and 'characteristic features."'"'
Justice Stevens does not advocate abandoning the reverse-Erie feature of Jensen.
If state law is applicable at all, it is applicable in federal court as well as state court.
Nor would Justice Stevens allow state law to apply automatically in admiralty
cases. He states:
(W]e should not lightly conclude that federal law of the sea trumps a duly
enacted state statute. Instead, we should focus on whether the state
provision in question conflicts with some particular substantive rule of
federal statutory or common law, or, perhaps, whether federal maritime
rules, while not directly inconsistent, so pervade the subject as to preclude
application of state law.
... Moreover state law[s] that affect maritime commerce, interstate and
foreign, are subject to judicial scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.3 '
If Justice Stevens' approach were to prevail the result would not be a wholesale
repudiation of the case-law that has resulted from Jensen. Justice Stevens would
continue to recognize that some federal rules of maritime law preempt state law.
He suggests going even further, creating a gray area where federal law so pervades
a subject that state law cannot be validly applied. If state law were not struck down
on these grounds, the state law might still run afoul of the dormant Commerce
Clause.
It is worth remembering that Jensen also relied on the "negative" or dormant
Commerce Clause. The Court said:
A similar rule in respect to interstate commerce, deduced from the grant
to Congress of power to regulate it, is now firmly established. Where the
subject is national in its character, and admits and requires uniformity of
regulation, affecting alike all the states, such as transportation between the
states, including the importation of goods from one state to another,
Congress can alone act upon it and provide the needed regulations. The
absence of any law of Congress on the subject is equivalent to its declara-
134. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 461, 114 S. Ct. 981, 992 (1994).
135. Id. He also notes that the Due Process Clause protects out of-state-defendants, "especially
foreigners," against assertions of state judicial power that may threaten maritime commerce. Justice
Stevens is referring to the assertions of personal jurisdiction that offend the Due Process Clause.
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tion that commerce in that matter shall be free .... And the same
character of reasoning which supports this rule, we think, makes impera-
tive the stated limitation upon the power of the states to interpose where
maritime matters are involved."3
Actually, Jensen's holding permitted greater room for state legislation than the
quoted language about the Commerce Clause would suggest. Under the Commerce
Clause, the Court saw no role for states in the regulation of interstate or foreign
commerce. But Jensen permitted a whole host of state regulations of maritime
commerce.
In any event, the negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence has changed since
Jensen was decided. The Court currently engages in a two-tier approach. If the
state statute discriminates against interstate commerce it is invalid unless the state
shows that it could not serve a legitimate local purpose by reasonable nondiscrimi-
natory alternatives. 137 But if the state statute is even-handed, then the Court will
weigh the state's interests against the interstate burdens to determine if the burden
is reasonable.' 3
In a sense the "negative" Commerce Clause is no more legitimate than Jensen.
Justice Stevens justifiably criticized Jensen because there is only a tenuous
connection between the grant of admiralty jurisdiction in Article III in the
Constitution and the strong federal preemption doctrine created by Jensen.'"
There is also only a tenuous connection between the grant of power to Congress to
regulate commerce and the current view of the authority of the states in this
area." An advantage to using the "negative" Commerce Clause as a basis for
resolving conflicts in admiralty is that it may harmonize these cases with the
broader set of federal-state conflicts.
However, there is a fundamental difference between the usual "negative"
Commerce Clause case and admiralty cases. In the former situation the federal
courts have no power to make common law. Congress' failure to legislate may be
seen as a tacit invitation for states to experiment. But in the admiralty area the
federal courts are empowered to make law."' For that reason Justice Stevens
insists that a court can only enforce a state statute in the maritime context if it
passes another test. It must not contravene a rule of judge-made law or, perhaps,
apply to an area dominated by judge-made law." 2
136. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217, 37 S. C1. 524, 529 (1916) (citations
omitted).
137. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 108 S. Ct. 1803 (1988).
138. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486 U.S 888, 108 S. Ct. 2218 (1988);
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 108 S. Ct 2080
(1986); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 S. Ct. 844 (1970).
139. American Dredging, SIO U.S. at 460, 114 S. C. at 991.
140. See Liza Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 217, 218-19.
141. See Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619, 624 (1996) (the general
maritime law is "a species of judge.made federal common law').
142. 510 U.S. at 461, 114 S. Ct. at 992 ("[W]e should focus on whether the state provision in
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In a sense, Justice Stevens proposes not so much an overruling of Jensen as an
updating of that decision. The major difference between Jensen and Justice
Stevens' approach is that under Jensen if there was no general maritime law on
point, the courts had a duty to make it. Under Justice Stevens' approach, the courts
would apply state law on these matters unless the issue is in an area where federal
law was already pervasive.
Nor would Justice Stevens' approach put an end to the uncertainty of whether
state law may supplement maritime law when there is a strong state concern.
Justice Stevens would not permit state law to apply if it "conflicts" with federal
law, but this still leaves a lot of room for state law to provide additional remedies
or otherwise to supplement federal law.
Let us consider a few cases to see how they might be decided under Justice
Stevens' approach. In De Loach v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd
Brasileiro,143 the Third Circuit considered whether a minor plaintiff could recover
damages for loss of society of his injured father, who was a longshore worker
injured aboard a vessel in Philadelphia. The court looked to the prevailing common
law of the states. It found that a majority of states denied recovery when a child
sustained loss of society due to non-fatal injuries suffered by a parent. It then
determined that admiralty case law should not fashion such a recovery. In part, the
court considered Congress' desire to limit the liability of stevedores and shipown-
ers. The case treated state law correctly under Jensen. The court found no rule in
either federal statutes or admiralty case law. It turned to the common law for
guidance and fashioned a rule that would be uniformly applied, even in those few
states that would have allowed recovery had the matter been decided under their
common law.
De Loach might be decided differently under Justice Stevens' analysis. If
Pennsylvania law had allowed recovery for this type of injury a court might
enforce that right even in a maritime context. The state law would not conflict
with a federal rule, assuming that the lack of a right to recover these damages
is seen as a "gap" in the federal law and not as a rule denying recovery.
However, a court might conclude that the Longshore Harbor Workers Compensa-
tion Act "so pervades the subject as to preclude application of state law."'"
Similarly, a court might conclude that the state's interest in providing damages
for children of injured parents (who already have recovered damages on their
question conflicts with some particular substantive rule of federal statutory or common law.")
(emphasis added).
143. 782 F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 1986). A similar issue arose in a First Circuit case, The Lyon v.
Ranger 111, 858 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1988). Then-Judge Breyer wrote that in the absence of a special
statutory liability scheme the court is "to use common law tort principles consistent with principles
of admiralty.... And, because the accident took place in Massachusetts waters only 1/4 mile from
the coast, we should turn to Massachusetts law." Id. at 27. The issue was whether to impute the
negligence of a diver to his fellow divers.
144. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 461, 114 S. Ct. 981, 992 (1994) (Stevens,
L., concurring).
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own behalf) is not sufficient to offset the burden on interstate and foreign
commerce.
A more complicated set of problems was presented by Muratore v. MIS Scotia
Prince," in which a photographer was alleged to have inflicted severe emotional
distress on a passenger aboard a ferry from Maine to Nova Scotia. The District
Court concluded that state law governed the claim under the maritime but local
doctrine. It found no federal rule on the subject, but found a compelling state
interest and no "unique maritime interest."'" The Court of Appeals accepted the
application of Maine law "for the purposes of [the] appeal" because parties did not
object to the application of state law."? Even though state law governed this
underlying issue, the two courts applied federal law to determine whether the vessel
owner was liable for the torts of the photographer who was an independent
contractor. They also applied federal law to the issue of punitive damages,
although the courts differed on whether punitive damages were appropriate.
The result seems justifiable under Jensen because the state interest in
regulating the infliction of emotional distress on passengers is strong and the
federal interests in having a uniform rule for commercial shipping is weak. The
federal interest is much stronger on the issue of the shipowner's liability for the
torts of an independent contractor and on the issue of punitive damages. If the case
were analyzed under Justice Stevens' approach the case would probably come out
the same. Certainly the state law of emotional distress would apply as this is a
matter of strong state interest that does not conflict with a federal law. The state
interest in determining the shipowner's liability would seem to be offset by the
federal judge-made law in this area. It is unclear how Justice Stevens would
resolve the issue of punitive damages. If there is a clear federal rule on the subject
it would prevail. But in the absence of such a rule, a strong state interest in
deterring wrongful conduct would probably be given effect.
After Yamaha, courts will be pressed to apply state law more readily in
personal injury cases on board local sightseeing vessels. State law sometimes gives
passengers on common carriers a greater level of protection than does maritime
law. Under state law the burden of proof might be more favorable to the injured
passenger or the standard of care might be higher than under maritime law. In the
past, courts have held that the federal rule preempts the state laws. 48 It seems
odd that states can regulate the rights of passengers on a sightseeing bus but not the
rights of those on a sightseeing boat. The issues presented by these cases are of
little federal interest with respect to a need for federal uniformity. The cases
mainly present issues of local concern. Even underJensen one could argue that the
145. 845 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1988), revg In part and vacating in part 656 F. Supp. 471 (D. Me.
1987).
146. 656 F. Supp. at 480 n.16.
147. .845 F.2d at 352 n.3.
148. E.g., Branch v. Schun, 445 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1971); Rindfleisch v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, 498 So. 2d 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1986); Reneau v. Shoreline Marine Sightseeing Co., 1986
AMC 1274 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
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state interests in protecting passengers on local sightseeing vessels outweighs a
remote federal interest in uniform regulation of all such vessels.
It is not clear if Justice Stevens would come to a different conclusion. Do the
rules requiring carriers to exercise only reasonable care and imposing the burden
of proof on the plaintiff count as "particular substantive rules of federal statutory
orcommonlaw"? Federal law prohibits a carrier from inserting in any contract any
provision purporting to relieve the carrier from liability for negligence. "9 But the
statute establishes only a floor not a ceiling to the carrier's liability standard. In
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,"° the Supreme Court held
that federal law preempted state tort law as applied to a licensee aboard a vessel.
The Court held that the "standards of maritime law" applied to injuries occurring
on board a vessel in navigable waters and that under maritime law a shipowner
"owes the duty of exercising reasonable care towards those lawflly aboard the
vessel who are not members of the crew."'"' Other courts have held that
Kermarec applies to passengers."' But it is still possible that under Justice
Stevens' approach a court would give weight to state law. There is some authority
that under maritime law carriers owe passengers the "highest degree" of care."'
One can therefore argue that state laws giving passengers similar protection do not
conflict with some "particular" federal rule.
The Stevens approach has some of the same characteristics as the Jensen
doctrine. It is impossible to know if a lack of recovery under federal law is a "gap"
or a rule denying recovery, and it still requires courts to engage in the difficult job
of balancing incommensurate state and federal interests.' These characteristics
may be seen either as deficiencies or as useful devices for giving the courts
flexibility and discretion. But if adopted, the Stevens approach would require
greater deference to states and would slow the development of federal judge-made
law. Courts would be more reluctant to create a new federal rule and would instead
apply state law more often.
VI. CONCLUSION
No solution to the admiralty jurisdiction, whether offered by Congress or by
the courts, will be simple or perfect. Three features of the current situation will
149. 46 U.S.C. § 183c (1994).
150. 358 U.S. 625, 79 S. CL 406 (1959).
151. Id. at 630, 79 S. CL at 410.
152. E.g., Rainey v. Paquet Cruises, Inc., 709 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1983); Gibboney v. Wright, 517
F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1975).
153. Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 9 S. Ct. 469
(1889); Moore-McCormack Lines v. Russak, 266 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1959).
154. As Justice Scalia observed:
This process is ordinarily called "balancing," but the scale analogy is not really
appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897, 108 S. Ct. 2224, 2225
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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continue. First, federal statutes will continue to govern in major areas of admiralty
litigation. The Jones Act"'5 and the Longshore Workers Harbors Compensation
Act"5 are the principal sources for determining the rights of injured seamen and
longshore workers, respectively. COGSA1 7 defines the rights of shippers of
goods under bills of lading. A federal statute defines the rights of ship owners to
limit their liability. Congress' ability to legislate in these areas and in any area
affecting maritime commerce is unquestioned.
A second feature of admiralty law will be that federal courts will continue to
make judge-made law. Federal judge-made law so extensively governs certain
areas of the law, such as collisions, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure,
that it would be wasteful to rule that federal judge-made law is inappropriate.
Third, state law will continue to regulate many matters that are not only
important to the states, but which would be hard for federal courts to regulated on
their own. This is particularly so when state legislatures have promulgated detailed
regulatory schemes. The federal courts are not well suited to fill in the void that
would be created if this legislation could not appropriately be applied in admiralty.
And it is unlikely that Congress will replace all of the state regulation with federal
legislation.
We are witnessing a Supreme Court that is sensitive to the interests of states
to govern themselves. This Court is reluctant to read federal statutes as preempting
state law-particularly in areas "traditionally occupied" by the states. 58 Some
of the justices are concerned that the federal courts' intrusion in these areas will
make political responsibility illusory.'59 Justice Ginsburg, the author of the
Yamaha decision, dissented in another case this term which struck down an
Alabama court's award of punitive damages as being excessive."se She thought
the Court "unnecessarily and unwisely venture[d] into territory traditionally within
the State's domain...." 6t We can expect the Court to give greater leeway to
state law in admiralty matters, especially when the federal interests are attenuated.
It would be helpful to recall that jurisdiction and choice of law are related
matters. When a federal or state judge determines that a case is within admiralty
jurisdiction, the judge is effectively saying that federal judge-made law might
govern the case. It follows that cases should be kept out of admiralty jurisdiction
only if it is clear that state law will govern this type of case. When it is clear from
the outset that state law will provide the rule of decision, there is no federal interest
in hearing the case in admiralty. Federal courts need not hear cases involving non-
diverse parties when it is clear that state law will provide the rule of decision.
155. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994).
156. 33 U.S.C. § 902 et seq. (1994).
157. 46 U.S.C. § 1300 Ct seq. (1994).
158. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. CL 2240. 2250 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 (1947)).
159. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1638 (1995) (Kennedy, 3., concurring).
160. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
161. Id. at 1614.
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Jurisdictional and choice of law questions need to be resolved differently.
There is a greater need for bright line rules to govern jurisdictional questions than
choice of law issues. Jurisdictional questions must be capable of resolution at an
early stage of litigation when many important facts are in dispute. It would be
wasteful for the federal courts and the parties to hold a mini-hearing to resolve the
jurisdictional question. By contrast, choice of law questions can usually wait.
As a consequence, the test for admiralty jurisdiction needs to be more inclusive
and simpler than the test for choice of law. The old locality rule which included
every tort occurring on the navigable water was such a rule. The Sisson test,"
which includes nearly every tort involving any type of vessel on the navigable
water also satisfies these needs. By contrast, the Kelly test,63 or any multi-factor
test, is not a good vehicle for determining jurisdiction. Such a test presents too
many variables and too much uncertainty for the parties and for the courts. The
Sisson test is an improvement over the locality rule in that it allows courts to easily
exclude a few types of cases, such as those involving only swimmers or surfboards,
where state law ought to apply. Unfortunately Sisson creates unnecessary doubt
about whether all torts involving vessels on navigable waters will be maritime torts.
One hopes that Yamaha's determination about admiralty jurisdiction involving the
collision of a jet ski and a commercial vessel-it required the Court to spend only
one sentence-will be the norm.
As for the choice of law problem, the courts are likely either to continue to
struggle under the Jensen doctrine, badly battered as it is, or under an approach like
that suggested by Justice Stevens in American Dredging. Either way the courts are
going to encounter uncertainty as they attempt to balance the needs of the states and
the needs of the federal government. Uncertainty may be the price we need to pay.
The kinds of federal-state conflicts that arise in the maritime context are so many
and so varied that it is unlikely that any one simple formula will satisfactorily
answer them all. For the moment, all that can be said is that the Court is likely to
give states more leeway in regulating maritime matters.
The line dividing land from sea has never been sharp or clear. There has
always been a blurring at the margins. The boundary has been a source of
confusion. It has also been an opportunity for creativity.'"
162. See supra text accompanying note 25.
163. See supra text accompanying note 22.
164. Compare Jerome G. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043,
1056 (1995) (Justice Thomas, concurring) (admiralty "once provided a jurisdictional rile almost as
clear as the 9th and 10th verses of Genesis" concerning the creation of the land and sea) with I.
Epstein, The Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 21b (1935) ("[If the lost article is found] in the
intertidal space of the seashore or on ground that is flooded by a river, then, even if it has an
identification mark, the Divine Law permits [the finder to acquire it]'). The ancient Akkadian
creation myth, Enuma Elish attributes the initial creation of the world to the commingling of the fresh
waters with the salt waters. See James B. Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts 61 n.3(d ed.
1969).
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